The recent report on the Titan submersible disaster, which resulted in the death of five individuals, has uncovered that the incident could have been prevented. The tragedy was attributed to a flawed experimental design and ignored safety warnings, with OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush bearing significant responsibility.
According to the 335-page report by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Rush was identified as the key figure behind the failure of the submersible. Rush disregarded engineers’ concerns regarding the vessel’s flawed design, leading to its implosion near the Titanic wreck in the North Atlantic Ocean in 2023.
Despite failed model tests and industry opposition, Rush insisted on using a five-inch-thick carbon fiber hull for the submersible, whose viewport was only rated for depths of 2,130 feet, falling short of the 12,500 feet required to reach the Titanic wreck.
The USCG Titan Marine Board of Investigation (MBI) chair, Jason Neubauer, stated, “This marine casualty and the loss of five lives was preventable.” The investigation highlighted multiple contributing factors to the tragedy, providing valuable lessons to avoid such incidents in the future.
The report found that Rush’s dominance and disregard for safety within OceanGate created an environment where the submersible’s implosion was almost inevitable. It pointed out OceanGate’s inadequate design, certification, maintenance, and inspection processes as primary contributing factors to the disaster.
The investigation revealed that OceanGate engineers and advisors had raised serious safety concerns about the submersible, but their warnings were ignored or sidelined by Rush. The flawed carbon fiber hull design and construction ultimately led to the structural failure and implosion of the Titan during its final dive.
Several red flags were raised during previous dives, but Rush continued to operate the submersible, concealing critical damage from the crew and clients. The report also highlighted instances where safety protocols were bypassed, critical damage was concealed, and a culture of suppressing safety concerns prevailed within OceanGate.
The report concluded that had OceanGate adhered to safety standards, fostered transparency, and prioritized safety over expediency, the tragedy could have been averted. The systemic failures within the company created an environment where risks were disregarded, leading to inevitable consequences.
In addition to Rush, other individuals who perished in the disaster were U.K. billionaire Hamish Harding, French mariner Paul-Henri Nargeolet, and father-son pair Shahzada Dawood and Suleman Dawood. The passengers were not fully informed of the experimental nature of the engineering involved or prior red flags, despite signing waivers.
The investigation called for stronger oversight, clear options for operators exploring new concepts in deep-sea exploration, and new legislation to expand U.S. oversight authority over deep-sea commercial submersibles carrying American citizens. International safety standards, a ban on unclassed passenger vessels at extreme depths, a national submersible registry, and potential legal actions were also recommended.
Overall, the report shed light on the preventable nature of the Titan submersible disaster and emphasized the importance of prioritizing safety in deep-sea exploration endeavors.
